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Abstrakt
Tato pra´ce popisuje implementaci a testova´n´ı Linuxove´ knihovny, vytvoˇrene´ pro poskytnut´ı
abstrakce mezi uzˇivatelem a instrukc´ı RdRand od Intelu (Ivy Bridge RNG). Samotna´ instrukce
je rovneˇzˇ zbeˇzˇneˇ popsa´na a jsou oveˇˇreny neˇktere´ jej´ı vlastnosti, jako kryptograficka´ bezpecˇnost
vy´stupn´ıch dat a rea´lna´ rychlost te´to instrukce.
Abstract
This thesis describes implementation and testing of a Linux library, created for providing an ab-
straction layer between a user and the Intel’s RdRand instruction (Ivy Bridge RNG). The in-
struction itself is briefly described and some of its properties are tested here, like cryptographic
strength of its output and the real speed of the instruction.
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Rozsˇ´ıˇreny´ abstrakt
Pocˇ´ınaje generac´ı Ivy Bridge, Intel zacˇal vybavovat sve´ procesory hardwarovy´m genera´torem
na´hodny´ch cˇ´ısel. Tento genera´tor, pojmenovany´ Intel Secure Key, je mozˇne´ vyuzˇ´ıvat pomoc´ı
strojove´ instrukce RdRand pro rychle´ z´ıska´n´ı na´hodny´ch cˇ´ısel s vysokou entropi´ı.
Intel Secure Key je zalozˇen na tepelne´m sˇumu ovlivnˇuj´ıc´ım chova´n´ı dvou vza´jemneˇ propojeny´ch
invertor˚u. Tyto invertory jsou oba nejprve nastaveny do stejne´ho stavu 1 (tedy jsou nestabiln´ı)
a po na´sledne´m odpojen´ı rˇ´ıd´ıc´ı cˇa´sti se jeden z nich pˇrepne do stavu 0. Pravdeˇpodobnost
pˇreklopen´ı konkre´tn´ıho invertoru by meˇla by´t 1:1 a podle toho, ktery´ invertor se pˇreklopil, je
vygenerova´n jeden bit. Na tento jednoduchy´ genera´tor navazuje filtrovac´ı logika, ktera´ se snazˇ´ı
odstranit korelace mezi vygenerovany´mi hodnotami. Protozˇe tato logika vy´razneˇ zpomaluje
generova´n´ı, je jej´ı vy´stup pouzˇit jako neusta´le se meˇn´ıc´ı inicializacˇn´ı vektor pseudona´hodne´ho
genera´toru zalozˇene´ho na AES algoritmech.
Rychlost RdRandu by podle Intelu meˇla dosahovat azˇ 800 MiB/s, pˇricˇemzˇ rychlost dostupna´
pro jednu vy´pocˇetn´ı jednotku procesoru odpov´ıda´ 800 / pocˇet jednotek. Rea´lne´ zkusˇenosti s
RdRandem jsou vsˇak male´ a jeho vyuzˇit´ı nen´ı zat´ım pˇr´ıliˇs rozsˇ´ıˇreno. Bylo tedy nutne´ prove´st
vy´konnostn´ı testy a oveˇˇrit jak tato tvrzen´ı, tak statisticke´ vlastnosti genera´toru.
Statisticke´ testy vy´stupu genera´toru nenalezly zˇa´dne´ chyby ani v neˇkolika des´ıtka´ch TB dat.
Vy´konnostn´ı testy potvrdily, zˇe rychlost RdRand instrukce na procesorech generace Ivy Bridge
se bl´ızˇ´ı uda´vane´ rychlosti a pro jej´ı dosazˇen´ı je tˇreba vyuzˇ´ıt vsˇech vy´pocˇetn´ıch jednotek. V
na´sleduj´ıc´ı generaci je vsˇak vy´kon pouze polovicˇn´ı, zˇrejmeˇ kv˚uli zmeˇna´m v architektuˇre. Tato
informace byla na´sledneˇ potvrzena Intelem.
S ohledem na odhalen´ı aktivit NSA Edwardem Snowdenem ve veˇci u´myslne´ho oslabova´n´ı kryp-
tograficky´ch standardu˚ a spolupra´ce s vy´robci HW a SW je vhodne´ veˇnovat zvy´sˇenou pozornost
i bezpecˇnosti tohoto genera´toru na´hodny´ch cˇ´ısel. V textu pra´ce jsou zbeˇzˇneˇ popsa´ny neˇktere´
mozˇnosti, jak by RdRand mohl negativneˇ ovlivnit bezpecˇnost syste´mu, ktery´ jej vyuzˇ´ıva´. Z
mozˇny´ch vektor˚u u´toku lze jmenovat napˇr´ıklad zmeˇnu elektricky´ch vlastnost´ı polovodicˇe ve-
douc´ı k odliˇsne´mu chova´n´ı, ktera´ pˇritom nen´ı zjistitelna´ ani pˇri opticke´ inspekci cˇipu.
K RdRandu je mozˇne´ pˇristupovat i skrz API poskytovane´ knihovnami jako je OpenSSL. To je
vsˇak komplikovaneˇjˇs´ı, nezˇ v pˇr´ıpadeˇ u´zce zameˇˇrene´ knihovny. Jednak to pˇrina´sˇ´ı rˇadu za´vislost´ı
na dalˇs´ıch knihovna´ch a jejich verz´ıch a jednak je takove´ rozhran´ı zbytecˇneˇ komplikovane´.
Cˇa´st software vytvoˇrene´ho pro tuto pra´ci byla tedy uvolneˇna jako knihovna pro operacˇn´ı syste´m
Linux, poskytuj´ıc´ı abstrakci nad instrukc´ı RdRand a umozˇnˇuj´ıc´ı snadno generovat veˇtˇs´ı mnozˇstv´ı
dat, nezˇ 16/32/64 bit˚u poskytovany´ch instrukcˇn´ı sadou procesoru. Rovneˇzˇ testova´n´ı, zda
konkre´tn´ı procesor disponuje touto instrukc´ı bylo zjednodusˇeno, nebotˇ AMD pracuje na vlastn´ı
varianteˇ genera´toru na´hodny´ch cˇ´ısel na procesoru a tato knihovna mu˚zˇe by´t snadno rozsˇ´ıˇrena i
pro dalˇs´ı implementaci. Vytvoˇrena´ knihovna ma´ jen minima´ln´ı za´vislosti na dalˇs´ım SW.
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1| Introduction
Generation of true random numbers is a stochastic process. In opposite, computers are deter-
ministic machines and thus they are unable to generate true random numbers by using abilities
of a Turing machine. But random numbers are crucial in cryptography and once computers
began to be used in this domain, people tried combine these two conflicting requests – to allow
a deterministic machine to act stochastically.
There are two solutions of this problem. We can stay with completely deterministic machines
and through series of mathematical operations compute pseudo random numbers, that seems
to be random, but when using the same initial state and algorithm, we get the same numbers
again. Or we can add some source of entropy to the system, a device that is physically stochastic
and measure the stochastic process (thermal noise, radioactive decay, etc.).
The second approach can provide real random numbers, but it requires online testing for case
of hardware failure and also, finding of an entropy source with a good speed, an uniform
distribution (without a bias) and with a reliable price, size, energy consumption and other
parameters is difficult. Because of this, a lower quality HW generator is connected with a device
that tests the bias and selects only some bits and then the generated random values are used as
a seed for a cryptographically secure pseudo-random generator, which can lead to great speed
enhancement without loosing much of the randomness.
The problematic of quality of the entropy for a specific purpose is wide and this work is not
intended to cover it to great length, but still this area has to be shortly mentioned. Clearly, differ-
ent request have a developer of a video game, a researcher performing a simulation and an army
for encrypting their information. The researcher needs numbers that seem to be random but
aren’t – he or she needs to be able to repeat the simulation with the same initial state to get
the same result1.
The video game developer can also need the repeatability (e.g. for generating a terrain), but in
another case, like decisions of an artificial intelligence, the repeatability may not be requested
and in case of gambling highly unwanted. And the army needs the random numbers generator
to be completely stochastic to prevent an enemy to decipher their messages. Another example,
where random numbers are used, is the Monte Carlo method of solving definite integrals. Each
of these cases has different requests for quality, speed and price.
Due to prices of Hardware Random Number Generators (HW RNG) and because the few cheap
solutions never got widely used, they were for long time domain of governments and big cor-
porations only, leaving the consumer electronic to rely on Pseudo-Random Number Generators
(PRNG). PRNG algorithms developed to great success over time, providing enough entropy for
what most people usually do and also for most of cryptographic needs (Cryptographically Secure
Random Number Generators - CSPRNG), but still it needs to be seeded by data with at least
some entropy from the beginning. And as more and more of our daily life depend on computers,
the importance of keeping our data secure have raised up.
In 2012 [13] Intel added a Digital Random Number Generator (DRNG) on their chips in Ivy
1In some cases of computing, researchers are even keeping the same machines, as a different machine would
provide a different result due to inner number representation and architectural differences [32]
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Bridge generation and allowed programmers to use it as part of instruction set of that CPUs.
Intel named the instruction RdRand and its own implementation and the underlying DRNG
hardware implementation is named Intel Secure Key (previously code-named Bull Mountain
Technology) [25]. Intel used combination of HW RNG and CSPRNG, solution known as Cascade
Construction RNG, where the relatively slow HW RNG2 works as a seed generator for much
faster CSPRNG. As is showed later in this thesis, in section 6.2 Testing, the difference in speed
is about thousand times.
This step brought HW RNGs to general public, but the limitation on Intel CPUs only means
that there is still big part of the information technology market without such solution - in x86
world there is another big player, AMD, who did not implemented this instruction yet and also
many different architectures, like ARM, in mobile devices. So programmers cannot count on
the presence of a HW RNG on casual computers yet.
Furthermore, the Intel’s RdRand instruction is still mostly unknown and there are also questions
about reliability of this generator, which is sealed into the chip and unable to be audited [33] if
it is really manufactured according of published scheme [22] or if there is a backdoor.
It is important to notice that if there could be a backdoor in the RNG, there could be possibly
backdoors also in any other parts of the CPU, opening possibilities for many others attacks which
could achieve the same result. But hiding a backdoor to RdRand could be done more easily than
to, for example, a HW acceleration for AES encrypting, so I agree with Linus Torvalds [5] that
RdRand alone is great if we do not need cryptographically secure numbers, but for cryptographic
usage, it is better to use it just as one of more sources of entropy and seed some CSPRNG
by it.
As I’m interested in computer security (on some level), as well as I’m interested in Linux,
when I got the possibility to work on implementation of a library using RdRand in production
environment of Red Hat corporation, I was interested in it and choose it as my thesis. During
the work, we have discovered unexpected issue with half performance on some CPU. This was
handed to Intel, yet without a result.
In spring 2014, when this thesis was written, no other implementation of RdRand than Intel’s
one existed3, so the term RdRand is used just as the instruction implemented by Intel Secure
Key technology.
2The HW RNG itself has output about 3 gigabits per second [9], but these values are biased, so amount
of the bites is reduced to concentrate the randomness.
3Although AMD is working on their own implementation for their future Excavator architecture [30], probably
named RDRND.
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2| Random Numbers and Deterministic Ma-
chines
The term Entropy is usually used as the measure of disorder and uncertainty of a system [6].
Claude E. Shannon defined it for information theory as the average of uncertainty (unpredictabil-
ity) of an information source [29, p. 396]. The important properties of an information source
with high entropy are [31, p. 150]:
Uniform distribution: Probability of each value should be the same; no values should be
generated with higher frequency of occurrence than others.
Independence: No value can be inferred from the others.
In this report the term entropy can also refer to a random value itself from a information source.
2.1| Pseudorandom Numbers
When we pass any value to a pseudorandom number generator (PRNG), the PRNG will produce
a long sequence of values, that seems to be random and statistical tests on these sequences
(if the PRNG is strong enough) should not find any correlation between the produced values.
However, the produced sequence is finite and thus after a time it become to repeat itself.
This is because the PRNG is just an implementation of an algorithm, computing mathematical
operations on the previously computed value (on the start of the PRNG, we need to fill it with
a seed - a starting value) and after finite count of steps the algorithm gets to the point of its
start.
A simple example of such PRNG, one of the most basic but the most widely used [31, p. 151],
is the linear congruential random number generator (LCRNG) defined as
Xn = (aXn−1 + b) mod m (2.1)
where Xn is the nth number of the sequence (Xn−1 respectively the previous). a, b and m are
constants and the selected values have big impact on quality of the output. X0 is a seed.
The LCRNGs are still useful because of their speed and easy implementation in various non-
cryptographic situations, when their disadvantages (most importantly their predictability [31,
p. 152, 153]) are not important [27, chapter 16.1].
Because with knowing the initial seed we can repeat all the pseudorandom sequence, it is
important to have a secure, random seed if we want to use a PRNG in cryptography, except
of having a cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator (CSPRNG). In computers,
the seed can be frequently extracted from hard-to-predict events like user interaction or network
communication.
We can say a sequence generator is pseudorandom, if its output looks random, even under
statistical tests.
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2.1.1| Cryptographically Secure PRNG
Encryption algorithms can sometimes be used as the PRNG, for example DES or AES. These
provide a very good result [31, p. 153-156]. Using of an encryption algorithm is planned as
a feature for the future version of the library.
The important property of a PRNG, that can be considered cryptographically secure, is un-
predictability. That means that it is impossible under our computational knowledge to predict
(forward or backward) any number, even if we know the used algorithm1 and/or the entropy
source(s). The forward/backward security has to apply also for cases when the inner state
of the RNG is disclosed, for example by reading it in memory.
The forward security grants us, that knowing of the current state of the generator, it is not
possible to learn the previously generated values. The backward security, also known as break-in
recovery means, that even if an attacker knows the state of the generator in a specific time, it
is not possible recover the state and thus predict future values.
2.2| True Random Numbers
To produce random values, true random number generators (TRNGs), are using physical events
that are hard to be predicted. The TRNGs can measure absolute values, timing or occur-
rence of such events. An examples of what can be used for generating true random numbers
are radioactive decay, avalanche effects on reverse-biased electronic components and thermal,
atmospheric and other sources of noise, and others [21, p. 6].
However, real using of such devices is problematic. The sources of entropy are frequently
somehow biased and cyclic, so it is necessary to have an online testing and filtering, which is
usually significantly slowing the output speed. Also, the price can be a problem too2.
2.3| Random Numbers in Linux
The Linux random number generator (LRNG) is gathering its entropy from events that are very
hard to predict: mouse movements, key-presses, interrupt sources of the system, jitter of access
times to disks. These events are saved with a timestamp into an entropy pool [36].
LRNG is offering an API for its use. Except of C function get random bytes, it also pro-
vides two device drivers, /dev/random and /dev/urandom. The difference between these two
devices is in way, how they handle user requests, providing two different levels of security.
The /dev/random is producing more secure randomness and if there is not enough entropy in
the entropy pool, then it can block the reader, until enough entropy is gathered. /dev/urandom
then never blocks its output and produce less secure values, but is faster3 [36, chapter 1].
1This is the reason, why LCRNGs are not considered as CSPRNGs - if an attacker have just 3 following numbers
of the basic LCRNG, Xi, Xi+1 and Xi+2, he can create an equation for each of them from the equation 2.1
Xn = (aXn−1 + b) mod m. The three equations creates a system of equations with 3 unknowns a, b and m,
which is very easy to solve. After solving it, the attacker knows all the constants and then he can compute any
preceding or following number in the sequence.
2They usually cost from hundreds to thousands Euros. For a brief overlook, see a comparison on Wikipedia [35].
3Just for illustration, the speed of /dev/random on my machine is about 300-400 KiB/s, while /dev/urandom
is about 16 MiB/s
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The LRNG is composed from three independent, asynchronous processes. Firstly, there is
the collection of the entropy from all system. In the second process, the entropy is saved into
the entropy pool and on last, when a random value is requested, the third process generates it
using SHA-1 algorithm 4 [36, chapter 2].
Figure 2.1: Scheme of the LRNG. The entropy is collected (C) and added (A) to the primary
pool. Entropy is extracted (E) from the secondary or urandom pool. Whenever entropy is
extracted from a pool, some of it is also fed back into this pool (broken line). The secondary
pool and the urandom pool draw entropy from the primary pool [36].
When a random value is generated, the process uses the relevant secondary or urandom pool as
the seed and the level of entropy in the pool is lowered. When the level of entropy is too low,
the pool is refreshed from the primary pool. In case of low entropy in all pools, the blocking
/dev/random waits until the system gathers more entropy, while /dev/urandom just generates
randomness from any entropy it has.
2.4| Summary
As was noted, good true random number generators are hard to find, especially for an end-user
usage. Although physical computers has some sources of entropy, with moving to virtualized
systems the sources are disappearing [21] and furthermore, with raising requirements of security,
the importance of good random numbers is more important than before.
Also, as is showed in Analysis of the Linux Random Number Generator [36], even kernel gener-
ators can has security flaws and allow some form of forward or backward attack.
For these reasons, it would be useful to have widely accessible and widespread fast and high
quality TRNG or at least slower TRNG with CSPRNG. That device should be available to all
users, even within virtualized systems. How RdRand can help with these points is shown in
other chapters of this thesis.
4In all the process, the only one non-linear cryptographic function is SHA-1, that is used three times, along
with some register shifting and pool mixing [36, section 2.6].
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3| The RdRand instruction
First public information about RdRand came sometime during year 2011 [13], a year before
the CPUs with it were released and Intel itself sends patches to add support into Linux in
summer of the same year [2]. Later, RdRand was added between Linux entropy sources for
/dev/[u]random. According to known information [33], Intel tried to have /dev/[u]random
rely only on their instruction, but that was denied.
After disclosure of extends of NSA spying activities by Edward Snowden in summer of 2013 [8,
26], a petition for removing RdRand from Linux entropy sources was created [5]. Although
supported by just 8 signatures, it got wide attention on information-technology aimed news
pages and magazines, like Slashdot.org [14]. The petition was closed after Linus Torvalds
responds with scorn:
. . .
Short answer: we actually know what we are doing. You don’t.
Long answer: we use rdrand as one of many inputs into the random pool, and we
use it as a way to improve that random pool. So even if rdrand were to be back-
doored by the NSA, our use of rdrand actually improves the quality of the random
numbers you get from /dev/random.
. . .
3.1| History
This is not for the first time Intel is producing a HW RNG. Around 1999, their chipsets of 8xx
series had a TRNG [15, chapter 1.3.5][4] as part of the Intel FWH (82802AB or 82802AC)
component. This RNG was analog – a thermal noise was affecting a resistor. The noise
was amplified and forwarded to a voltage–controlled oscillator. Its output was combined with
another oscillator with much higher frequency and the drift between these two frequencies
provided the requested entropy [20].
Pairs of generated bits were digitally processed, using Von Neumann Corrector to enhance its
statistical properties by removing some bias. Due to this, the RNG has a variable bitrate,
averaging around 75 Kbit/sec.
Input Bits Output
0, 0 None
0, 1 1
1, 0 0
1, 1 None
Table 3.1: A Von Neumann corrector
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3.2| Intel Secure Key
The Intel Secure Key (ISK) uses cascade construction, combining a HW RNG with CSPRNG
into one sealed block on CPU, which is compliant with many security standards, including NIST
SP800-90, FIPS-140-2, and ANSI X9.82 [18]. Although it is impossible to audit it, there was
found no evidence of low entropy or anything that would deny the security standards compliance
- neither with tests in section 6.1 Testing, nor any other tests anyone else did1.
3.3| Physical Implementation
One important thing about ISK with a big impact on the performance, but also price of that
solution is that there is only one unit on a die and the unit should be the same on all CPUs2 [18,
Chapter. 3.1]. Because all processing units (PUs)3 on one die share the RNG, one thread reading
random numbers from it can never be faster than Totalspeed 1PUs . The effect of this is that
the performance is scalable until amount of PUs and the maximum output speed are exceeded
(see section 6.2 Testing), and price of the CPU is less affected.
Each ISK unit consists three basic parts: A hardware entropy source, a conditioner and a de-
terministic random bit generator (DRBG) [18]. The frequency of the RNG is independent on
the rest of the CPU and is set to 800 MHz.
Figure 3.1: An Intel Secure Key unit
3.3.1| Entropy Source
The entropy source is a metastable circuit, with unpredictable behavior based on thermal
noise [10]. In figure 3.2, the middle (red) part is the heart of the circuit, a RS-NOR latch.
As its reset and set inputs are wired together, when an impulse is brought on these inputs,
1I assume that such revelation would become quickly known and broadly discussed, but all tests I have found
have the same conclusion as mine.
2We didn’t find the
”
be the same“ officially confirmed and it can change in future CPUs. But empirical test
results made on range of different CPU types provided the same characteristics, with exception of Intel Xeon
CPUs as is described in the 6.
3Two physical cores with hyper-threading count as four PUs.
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the latch sets to 1 or 0 based on thermal noise. To provide better distribution, there is the bot-
tom (blue) negative feedback. Based on the output of the latch, charge on capacitors in
the negative feedback is adjusted and then this negative feedback slightly shifts the chance for
next bit to be opposite. The longer is a sequence of the same bits, the higher charge is on
the capacitors and bigger effect it has.
Finally, when the latch is settled in one state, the top (green) part of the circuit detect it, saves
the bit (and send it further), wait a little time and then it sends a pulse on the R/S inputs
of the latch to produce a new bit. This entropy source has its own frequency, different from
the rest of the RNG, about 3 GHz.
Figure 3.2: Circuit scheme of the entropy source [10].
3.3.2| Conditioner
The entropy source provides random bits with some entropy, but due to implementation and
the feedback, it can be unbalanced and produce values in something close to oscillating patterns.
For this reason, there is the conditioner that adds them to a 256 bit pool, make a set of XOR
and AES operations over lower and upper half of the pool and test health of the pool4 [22, 10].
If the pool is not healthy, the set of operations is repeated.
3.3.3| DRBG
Because the output speed of the conditioner is too slow (just 256 bits per few microseconds),
a deterministic random bit generator is connected to the 256 bit pool and every few microseconds
(if the pool is healthy) takes it as a new seed. This pseudo random generator then computes
65.536 bits values using a 128-bit AES and put them to an output buffer. From there, they
4The health check is done by counting six different bit patterns in the 256–bit pool and comparing the counts
with empirically chosen values. The pool is healthy only if the numbers are in the specified ranges.
10/40
CHAPTER 3 THE RDRAND INSTRUCTION
can be taken by the RdRand instruction after 64-bit blocks5 [22, 10]. Reseeding of the DRBG
is required after all 1024 blocks are used, but usually it will reseed more frequently, about each
10 microseconds [18, Chapter 4.4].
3.3.4| Built-in Self-Tests (BIST)
Intel Secure Key contains also built-in self-tests. After a reset, the BIST at first test health
of the DRBG and conditioner, then it tests the entropy source. In the first part, ES is discon-
nected, a previously determined bit sequence is ’generated’ and the BIST checks the output with
a built-in value. In second phase, the entropy source is connected and few sequences are gen-
erated. If the entropy source would be bad, the previously checked health check in conditioner
would detect it.
In case one of the BIST parts would not be finished correctly and the RdRand instruction is
called, just zeros are returned and carry flag is cleared [22].
3.4| Existing Usages
RdRand is already used in Linux kernel for both blocking and non-blocking pools. For the non-
blocking pool(/dev/urandom), it is possible to completely feed the pool with RdRand [2].
For blocking pool (/dev/random), the RdRand is used as one of more entropy sources in
drivers/char/random.c.
Listing 3.1: Adding RdRand (and any other platform-depending HW RNG) to blocking pool
with XOR, at line 1042 in drivers/char/random.c [1].
for (i = 0; i < LONGS (20); i++) {
unsigned long v;
if (! arch_get_random_long (&v))
break;
hash.l[i] ^= v;
}
Another well-known and widely spread system already using RdRand is OpenSSL. This library
added the support in version 1.0.1 [24, Chapter. 3.2 Generation]. There the RdRand is provided
as one engine of many and requires to be explicitly enabled.
Listing 3.2: Simplified example of usage of RdRand in OpenSSL [24].
OPENSSL_cpuid_setup ();
ENGINE_load_rdrand ();
ENGINE* eng = ENGINE_by_id("rdrand");
ENGINE_init(eng);
ENGINE_set_default(eng , ENGINE_METHOD_RAND );
// Here use the engine with some RAND_ method
ENGINE_finish(eng);
ENGINE_free(eng);
ENGINE_cleanup ();
564 bits are always taken out, no matter what size is the target register of the instruction. Thus, it is not
possible to achieve the full speed of the DRBG on 32-bit system, as there is no difference for the Intel Secure
Key usage from pulling 64 bits. Just some bits are thrown away. See subsection 6.2.3 Testing for a performance
test.
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In Windows 8, RdRand is used for example during boot for ASLR (Address Space Layout Ran-
domization) [28, 34].
3.5| Security
Security of the RNG is important, but it is hard to check. During the last few years, the pos-
sibility of hardware Trojans (malicious manipulation during the manufacturing process) gained
attention, but none was yet found. This doesn’t necessarily means that no such exists, because
detection methods are much more difficult than with their software kindreds, and frequently
destructive.
If such Trojan is not detected in software because of altering verifiable outputs (like AES
HW Acceleration, which would not encrypt the data), there is not much other ways, than
to slice the chip and optically inspect it. The verification against a
”
golden chip“ is expensive,
destructive and slow and requires to have the
”
golden“, trusted chip for comparison. Yet it can
find alterations in circuits that could open some backdoors. But recently, another possible attack
vector was described by international group of scientists in their work Stealthy Dopant-Level
Hardware Trojans [3], in which they directly presented such attack on the Intel’s RdRand.
This new category of attack is not modifying the circuits’ layout and is undetectable by the opti-
cal inspections, because it affects the functionality of transistors instead of changing the layout.
By slight changes in doping6, the modified gate can become static.
While with a correct RdRand an attacker has a chance of 1/2128 to correctly guess a random
number, the described attack could increase the chance to 1/2n [3, Chap. 3.2, page 9], but
the output of such modified RdRand is still looking randomly. In the work n = 32 is achieved,
while it still pass NIST random number test suite.
This kind of attack (predictability) is different from what the authors of the petition [5] for
removing RdRand from /dev/random fears. Their point is that RdRand, as a part of the CPU,
can actively try to reduce entropy of the pool. If the RdRand knows with which values its output
is XORed (they can be in cache of the CPU), it can produce inverted value and effectively impact
the entropy pool. But I don’t have enough understanding of this Linux subsystem to be able
to evaluate this claim.
6Doping means adding specific impurities to the clear silicon to change its electric properties.
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According the needs of Red Hat I created a library providing basic interface over the RdRand
instruction as well as a simple application using this library. The most important reason for
Red Hat’s own implementation was licensing; Intel has supplied its own library providing similar
interface to this one, but under its own license, which could cause problems with modification,
redistribution and in combination with GNU GPL. Thus, this work has been released under GNU
LGPL 2.11. Also, it was important to test the library and to create documentation for it.
When drafting the library interface, I have at first surveyed the library example from Intel [18], as
well as OpenSSL API [23]. The first draft included functions described in API in 4.1.2.2 (simple
wrappers) and 4.1.2.3 (single numbers) and one function for longer sequences:
rdrand_get_bytes_retry.
Also, I planned to implement not only the usual, fast method, but also some more secure, that
would avoid relying on the security of the CSPRNG (see section 3.3 The RdRand instruction
for more details), yet I wasn’t sure about an interface for this functionality.
This draft was discussed with Jiˇr´ı Hladky´. A need for more functions for longer sequences
emerged from the discussion, so other functions from 4.1.2.4 (multiple numbers) were added
and also the more secure generation was discussed. Initially, I wanted to implement the fast or
more secure method switch as a state variable, set up in an initialization function or passed as an
argument to the generating functions. After deeper analysis of such solution and its impact on
performance and usability, I decided to implement the more secure methods as two independent
functions, described in 4.1.2.5 (secure generating).
Also, the library could be used on machines with current hardware, but with legacy software with
no support for RdRand in system libraries (for example RHEL 5). For this reason, dependency
on system libraries of specific versions was declined. This means that although Linux has
a X86 FEATURE RDRAND flag for testing whether the RdRand is available and function similar
to wrappers in 4.1.2.2, it wasn’t used.
In March 2014, this library (and the generator) was pushed into Fedora package repository [37,
38] in version 1.0.5. In later versions, the functionality of this library is going to be extended
above the requested and described range. Specifically, some sort of encryption of generated
values is going to be added to counter the possibility of predicable output.
4.1| API
The library, if installed into the system, can be included by using #include <librdrand.h>.
In the time of this work, the library is using the following API.
4.1.1| Constants
RDRAND SUCCESS Returned by function if a random number(s) was generated correctly.
1For full text of the license, see [7].
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RDRAND FAILURE Returned by function if a random number(s) was NOT generated cor-
rectly.
RDRAND SUPPORTED Returned by rdrand_testSupport function if the CPU supports
RdRand.
RDRAND UNSUPPORTED Returned by rdrand_testSupport function if the CPU doesn’t
know RdRand.
4.1.2| Functions
4.1.2.1| Non-Generating Functions
These functions are not generating any random numbers.
int rdrand_testSupport ( void ) – Detect if the CPU support RdRand instruction. Returns
RDRAND_SUPPORTED or RDRAND_UNSUPPORTED.
4.1.2.2| Simple Wrappers
These methods are simply wrappers of an ASM code, which generates only one n-bits number.
Although these functions are provided, I expect that they will be used only infrequently. Returns
RDRAND SUCCESS or RDRAND FAILURE.
int rdrand16_step ( uint16 t *x ) – Generates 16 bits of entropy through RdRand.
int rdrand32_step ( uint32 t *x ) – Generates 32 bits of entropy through RdRand.
int rdrand64_step ( uint64 t *x ) – Generates 64 bits of entropy through RdRand.
4.1.2.3| Generating Single Number
More complex functions than the previous – in case of RdRand failure, these functions will try
it again for the specified amount of times. Negative retry limit implies default value with
which the library is compiled. Returns RDRAND SUCCESS or RDRAND FAILURE.
int rdrand_get_uint16_retry ( uint16 t *x, int retry limit ) – Generates 16 bits of en-
tropy through RdRand.
int rdrand_get_uint32_retry ( uint32 t *x, int retry limit ) – Generates 32 bits of en-
tropy through RdRand.
int rdrand_get_uint64_retry ( uint64 t *x, int retry limit ) – Generates 64 bits of en-
tropy through RdRand.
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4.1.2.4| Generating Multiple Numbers
As a single random value is usually not enough, the library provides also functions for generating
multiple bytes of random values. For higher speed, all these functions are generating values in
64bit blocks when it is possible. These functions also accept retry limit as the previous ones.
Returns bytes of successfully generated values.
size t rdrand_get_bytes_retry ( void *dest, const size t size, int retry limit ) – Gen-
erate size bytes of random data.
size t rdrand_get_uint64_array_retry ( void *dest, const unsigned int count, int
retry limit ) – Generate count of 64bit blocks of random data.
size t rdrand_get_uint32_array_retry ( void *dest, const unsigned int count, int
retry limit ) – Generate count of 32bit blocks of random data.
size t rdrand_get_uint16_array_retry ( void *dest, const unsigned int count, int
retry limit ) – Generate count of 16bit blocks of random data.
size t rdrand_get_uint8_array_retry ( void *dest, const unsigned int count, int
retry limit ) – Generate count of 8bit blocks of random data.
size t rdrand_fwrite ( FILE *f, const size t count, int retry limit ) – Generate count
bytes of random values and write it to the f stream
4.1.2.5| Secure Generating
As documented in the chapter 3 The RdRand instruction, the CPU is using an pseudorandom
generator in connection with an entropy source. If the user want to avoid the risk of taking two
numbers from the same pool, that were generated from the same seed by the PRNG for some
reason, it is possible to use these functions, that guarantee2 by reseeding the internal entropy
pool, that each 64-bit generated value is independent on the previous or the next one.
These methods should be used only in a single thread. If more threads or processes try to gen-
erate random numbers with these two methods, the library has no possibility to enforce the re-
seeding of the PRNG and the numbers generated in two different threads can be from the same,
non-regenerated pool. However, between numbers in one thread, the reseeding is always guar-
anteed3 with all reliability we can have without knowing the implementation details.
size t rdrand_get_uint64_array_reseed_delay ( uint64 t *dest, const size t count,
int retry limit ) – Generate count of 64bit values. Forces reseed by waiting 20 microseconds
before each generating. The delay duration was selected according a delay in Intel’s reference
2Based on description of Intel Secure Key in subsection 3.3.3 The RdRand instruction. Verification of this
claim is not possible due to sealed implementation in the CPU.
3According to known information [22, sec. 2.4.2], the DRBG requires reseeding after 512 128-bit outputs,
that is 1024 of 64-bit. Thus if this amount of generated values is skipped, the pool has to regenerate.
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implementation, but was doubled for sake of higher security. It can happen that the reseeding
speed can be slower than this delay (if the speed with non-secure methods is markedly – more
then half – slower than the ideal 800 MiB/s) and in such situation this delay may not be enough.
size t rdrand_get_uint64_array_reseed_skip ( uint64 t *dest, const size t count, int
retry limit ) – Generate count of 64bit values. Forces reseed by generating and throwing away
10244 64-bit values per one saved.
4.2| RdRand Calling
The RdRand instruction is called in three functions: rdrand16_step, rdrand32_step
and rdrand64_step. In case that the compiler compiling this library knows RdRand instruc-
tion and x86intrin.h header file is included, the three named functions are just a renaming
of rdrandXX step functions. But if the compiler does not know the instruction (for example
when the version is too old), or the header file is not installed on the system, then the functions
directly call a byte code.
Listing 4.1: Byte code called in rdrand64 step.
asm volatile (".byte 0x48; .byte 0x0f; .byte 0xc7; .byte 0xf0; setc %1"
: "=a" (*x), "=qm" (err));
Byte code instead of instruction in the assembly language is used to support compilers that do
not know RdRand instruction. A specific example of such compiler can be Red Hat Enterprise
Linux 5, whose gcc compiler is from year 20085.
If the library is compiled for a 32-bit system, then the rdrand64_step function contain two
calls of the RdRand instruction to fill lower and higher half of a 64-bit number, as it is not
possible to use 64-bits registers on a 32-bit system.
4.3| Intelligent Generating
Most functions of the library that generates an array fill the array values one by one, as it was
passed to the function, just using larger data type if possible, having as little operations as
possible. The rdrand_get_bytes_retry is the only one that is applying a simple heuristic
for achieving the best possible speed even when passed memory area is not aligned to 64-bit
blocks.
The function computes offset of the first 64-bit aligned block within the given memory space
and then, if the offset is different than 0, it fills the few unaligned bytes at the beginning
individually. After that, the generating continues like in other methods by filling 64-bit blocks
until the end, potentially ending again by less than 8 bytes that need to be filled individually
(not in 64-bit chunk). Because of this approach, the function has a performance impact that
can be notable on small memory areas6, but on large aligned areas the performance difference
is almost undetectable.
41023 should be enough, but 1024 is better to remember.
5According information provided by gcc itself on any machine with RHEL 5.
6See section 6.2 Testing for details.
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4.4| Support Testing
Because the RdRand instruction is not accessible on all machines, it is necessary to provide
an easy tool to check it. This is done by function rdrand_testSupport. This function gets
information about a CPU through cpuid assembly language instruction and tests a vendor
string of the CPU. If the string is “GenuineIntel”, the CPU vendor is Intel7 and it is possible
to test feature bits of the CPU for RdRand flag. Without the vendor check, it would be possible
that some other vendor has another feature flag on the same bit as Intel has RdRand.
4.5| Development and Testing Options
Testing whether some functions that should produce random numbers are correctly working
(and for example not just reusing part of memory without overwriting it) is difficult. Thus, it is
possible to compile the library with defined constant STUB RDRAND8. This overwrites the RdRand
instruction calling, resulting in all returned bits enabled (each byte is 0xFF). This allows to easily
see, whether the generated values are correctly used in full length.
7Currently the only vendor providing this instruction. See chapter 3 The RdRand instruction
8When using gcc, flag -dSTUB RDRAND can be used.
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Because the library is for C language only, using it for example with shell scripts would be
difficult. For this reason, a simple application was also created, which is installed with the library,
and which can be used for generating random values without the need of using C language
by the user.
The generator has four optional command-line parameters to modify its behavior. Firstly,
--amount can be used to generate specific amount of bytes of randomness. Suffixes K, M, G
and T are accepted for easier use and when this option is not used, the application is generating
indefinitely until it is stopped, for example by KILL signal.
The second parameter is --method, which allows user to change the default method
rdrand_get_bytes_retry for the two reseeding functions. The names of the methods are
made shorter for the interaction with the user. Third parameter --output is used for specifying
the output file – without it, the random values are printed on stdout.
The --threads can specify, how many threads the generator will run in parallel for better
performance (as measured in section 6.2 Testing, a single core can’t utilise RdRand fully).
By default it is set to 2, because according to Intel [17], in Ivy Bridge generation of CPUs (in
which the instruction was added) there are still CPUs with just two processing units.
5.1| Underflow Recovery
Although is stated in Intel’s Software Developer Manual [16, chapter 7.3.17] that exceeding
the speed of the internal generator is unlikely, and although according to unverified information
(for example on StackOverflow [19]) it should not be possible to achieve it in current generations
(specifically on Ivy Bridge) of Intel’s CPU, we decided that the application should be working
with good performance even in case of slower internal generator. The importance of this decision
become even more obvious after finding that on dell-pr1700-02.lab.bos.redhat.com the CPU
wasn’t able to handle more than four parallel threads reading from RdRand1.
The principle is simple: By default, there is tolerance for few failures, implemented in the library
itself. In such case, a new call of the RdRand instruction is made immediately after a failure.
But if the RdRand is too slow, amount of the failures in a row exceeds a specific limit2.
In case of exceeding of the HW RNG speed, the generator application tries to lower the speed
of acquiring. This is at first done by decrementing threads count by one and new try. If this
solution is not working or is not possible (that means, when the threads count was lowered
to a single thread, or was such from the beginning), delays are being inserted between calls.
The delays are then lengthened with each unsuccessful call. If even in this case the HW RNG
is not able to provide enough random values, the application ends with an error message3.
1Unfortunately, I cannot provide a statistic probability of such situation – only one machine from all I have
tried had this problem and I wasn’t able to find that anyone other would experienced this too, which is, with
regards of the currently low usage of the instruction, not surprising.
2Currently 3, but can be changed in the source code.
3Such situation would be clearly a sign of a hardware error and thus it is questionable if the generated values
would be still really random
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During the development, we measured speed of the library and after getting the code on decent
performance and finishing the main development work, we also used some statistical tests
batteries. More information about these can be found in section 6.1 Testing.
For the tests, multiple operating systems were used.
OS Arch. Kernel version GCC version
RHEL 5.10 i686 2.6.18-348.el5PAE Red Hat 4.1.2-54
RHEL 5.10 x86 64 2.6.18-348.el5 Red Hat 4.1.2-54
RHEL 6.4 i686 2.6.32-358.el6.i686 Red Hat 4.4.7-3
RHEL 6.4 x86 64 2.6.32-358.el6 Red Hat 4.4.7-3
RHEL 7.0 x86 64 3.10.0-54.0.1.el7 Red Hat 4.8.2-3
Table 6.1: Used systems versions.
All tests were done on all listed systems1. Fresh instalation of the operating system was made
on every machine for these tests. No additional than default services were running and no other
work was done with the machine during the tests.
6.1| Statistical Testing
OS Arch. Machine
RHEL 7 x86 64 hp-aladdin-01.lab.bos.redhat.com
RHEL 5 x86 64 intel-brickland-02.lab.eng.rdu.redhat.com
RHEL 7 x86 64 intel-canoepass-01.lab.eng.rdu.redhat.com
RHEL 5 x86 64 intel-canoepass-02.lab.eng.rdu.redhat.com
Because it is important to be sure that generated values are truly random, two test suites were
used: PractRand and TestU01. From PractRand, test battery RNG test was used and from
TestU01, BigCrush and Alphabit. These test suits found no deviation at all.
6.1.1| PractRand
From PractRand suite, just the shipped RNG test battery was used in the manner of listing 6.1.
About 16 TB of randomness was tested for a single run of PractRand battery.
Listing 6.1: PractRand test battery usage
(time ( stdbuf -eL -oL rdrand -gen -t$SIMPLE_THREADS -o \
>(stdbuf -oL RNG_test stdin32 -tlmax 16T -tlfail) ) )
6.1.2| TestU01
Test01 is, in opposite of PractRand, a C library, without any shipped binaries usable for testing.
Thus a testing program TestU01 raw stdin input with log by Jiˇr´ı Hladky´ [12] was used.
1For raw data see Appendix A Attachments
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This program can read values from standard input and pass it to the test batteries, which can
be selected. The used commands are in listing 6.2 to listing 6.4. On every machine, threads
count for the generator was set to number of PUs -1, leaving one PU for system and the test
itself.
Listing 6.2: TestU01 BigCrush battery
(time ( stdbuf -eL -oL rdrand -gen -t THREADS -o \
>(stdbuf -oL $TESTU01 -b) ) )
Listing 6.3: TestU01 Alphabit battery for all bits
(time ( stdbuf -eL -oL rdrand -gen -t THREADS -o \
>(stdbuf -oL $TESTU01 --Alphabit =40:0:32) ) )
Listing 6.4: TestU01 Alphabit battery for one bit
(time ( stdbuf -eL -oL rdrand -gen -t THREADS -o \
>(stdbuf -oL $TESTU01 --Alphabit =35:0:1) ) )
The TestU01 batteries tested on each run about 20 terabytes of randomness at sum.
6.1.3| Conclusion
The statistical tests passed successfully with tens of TB of generated data. This can’t provide
reliable information whether the RdRand has a backdoor or some side-channel security hole (see
section 3.5 The RdRand instruction for more details), but it shows that the generated values
have good statistical properties and cannot by distinguished from real random numbers.
6.2| Performance Testing
Because the performance of the RNG is important, we had to measure it. There are generally
two options how the performance can be measured:
• Speed of the library itself, minimizing other influences
• Speed of the application using the library, including printing the generated values on stdout
Although during the development both options were measured, here the first option is tested pri-
mary, because it provides better information about the Intel Secure Key, not so biased by output
routines or by speed of a memory medium.
A Bash script named perftest.sh in the tests/ directory contains a battery of performance
tests, which are described later in subsections. The battery runs the specified set of tests ten
times to get a median values, in cyclic way; between two runs of each test, all other tests were
started. Within each test description, the used command called in the test is included. All other
options that are not specified within such command were left with default values of the RdRand
executable2:
• --numbers, -n: printing of generated values is not enabled
• --thread, -t: 2 threads used for generation
2Only relevant options that has an impact on the performance are described.
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• --duration, -d: 3 seconds – empirically measured that 3 seconds are the minimum
duration when the result is not influenced by initialization overhead.
• --repetition, -r: 2 times repeat the test, print the average value – important when
testing all methods at once.
• --chunk-size, -c: size of the memory space filled in one call: 2048 of 64-bit values –
empirically selected the minimum size which is not slowing the speed by overhead, that
means bigger value has no performance effect.
But usually, the duration was set to 5 seconds to be sure that the measured speed is not
influenced by startup overhead. Repetition was disabled (set to 1) as only one method is
tested at a time and all the tests are started repeatedly. Amount of threads was depending on
the specific test as well as the size of the chunk and generated values weren’t printed at all.
The listing 6.5 shows how the speed was measured on the generator application, as it doesn’t
have any built-in speed test like the test in listing 6.6.
Listing 6.5: Measuring speed of the generator application.
./rdrand -gen -t THREADS -n AMOUNT | pv -c >/dev/null
Listing 6.6: Usage of the testing application
./ RdRand -m METHOD -r1 -d5 [OTHER OPTIONS]
The test application creates a memory space of given size (chunk-size)and call the specified
library function to fill it. The library function is then called repeatedly for the given time, so
the measured speed is not biased by memory allocations or other overhead in the test application
and is close to what is the ideal speed of the library, at least if the running time is long enough.
6.2.1| Speed Scattering
OS Arch. Machine
RHEL 7 x86 64 hp-aladdin-01.lab.bos.redhat.com
RHEL 6 x86 64 hp-aladdin-01.lab.bos.redhat.com
RHEL 5 x86 64 hp-aladdin-01.lab.bos.redhat.com
To be able to evaluate results of tests, it is necessary to know the spread of speeds in the same
conditions during a time. The listing 6.7 shows command used in the test, which was started
1000 times overall (in ten of one-hundred blocks) and measured the speed of a single thread.
Listing 6.7: Test script for scattering testing.
./ RdRand -m rdrand_get_bytes_retry -r1 -d5 -t1
Each version of RHEL has a different histogram and statistical properties, caused by differences
in used scheduler settings, system libraries, and compiler and kernel version. The differences
weren’t deeply investigated, because important was the performance on an unmodified system,
not on a system optimized for best speed of this library.
Results of RHEL 5 have the smallest standard deviation (about 1.7 %), but also the lowest
median of speed. As the histogram shows, most of runs had speed about 213 MiB/s or little
less. Because the speed differences are small, this operating system was selected as the main,
from which the results are usually showed in other tests.
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Figure 6.1: Histogram of measured speeds on RHEL 5.
Minimum value 198.194 MiB/s
Maximum value 214.821 MiB/s
Ar. mean 211.700 MiB/s
Median 213.166 MiB/s
Std. deviation 3.711 MiB/s
Table 6.2: Statistical properties on RHEL 5
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Figure 6.2: Histogram of measured speeds on RHEL 6.
Minimum value 200.201 MiB/s
Maximum value 215.662 MiB/s
A. mean 213.165 MiB/s
Median 215.207 MiB/s
Std. deviation 3.985 MiB/s
Table 6.3: Statistical properties on RHEL 6
The measured speeds are mostly about 215 MiB/s, but quite large amount is gathered on
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205 MiB/s mark. RHEL 6 has the best performance results on a single thread, but as can be
seen in subsection 6.2.3 Testing, the performance has absolutely different profile from other
versions of RHEL once it runs in more threads than the machine has processing units.
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Figure 6.3: Histogram of measured speeds on RHEL 7.
Minimum value 174.253 MiB/s
Maximum value 224.970 MiB/s
A. mean 209.822 MiB/s
Median 214.774 MiB/s
Std. deviation 16.615 MiB/s
Table 6.4: Statistical properties on RHEL 7
RHEL 7 has far the worst standard deviation and while on RHEL 5 and 6 there are one or
two dominating speeds, in case of RHEL 7 there are three values, pretty far away (about 180,
214 and 224 MiB/s). On this version of RHEL, the measured speed was the highest, but also
the lowest.
6.2.2| Scaling
OS Arch. Machine
RHEL 5 x86 64 hp-aladdin-01.lab.bos.redhat.com
This test shows how the output speed depends on count of used threads for both the rdrand-gen
application shipped with the library and RdRand performance testing application.
Listing 6.8: Test application command.
./ RdRand -r1 -d5 -m rdrand_get_bytes_retry -t COUNT
Listing 6.9: Generator application command.
./rdrand -gen -t THREADS -n\$(( THREADS *400))M
On the Figure 6.4 Amount of generated bytes in dependency of threads count can be seen
that the average performance per one thread is about 170 MiB/s up to four threads. Then,
on about 730 MiB/s is the performance peak, where it is not possible to get higher speed
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anymore by adding more threads. Because the performance gets stable now (does not drop),
this stabilization cannot be caused by scheduler (as the scheduler cause the drop down later in
the graph). Thus this has to be the performance limit of the Intel Secure Key.
Because the machine has 8 processing units, but the speed of ISK is reached on 4 threads,
the performance is constant from reaching the peak to 8 threads. After that, the operating
system began to interrupt the threads to allow all threads to use the CPU and the performance
drops to about 500 MiB/s. With more threads, the PUs are better utilized and the performance
again rises, but will not achieve the previous value.
Also the difference between the test application and the shipped generator is visible on the peak.
The difference is rising with the amount of generated data and on the peak it is about 14 %.
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Figure 6.4: Amount of generated bytes in dependency of threads count.
For a single thread, the performance of the thread is above average and it seems to be because
the system is giving more computing time to the thread in comparison when another thread is
started.
The maximum speed of about 730 MiB/s is equal to 730×2
10×210
106
= 765 Hz. This is similar
to the ideal 800 Hz value given in the section 3.3 The RdRand instruction.
6.2.3| Differences Between OS Versions
OS Arch. Machine
RHEL 5 i686 hp-aladdin-01.lab.bos.redhat.com
RHEL 5 x86 64 hp-aladdin-01.lab.bos.redhat.com
RHEL 6 x86 64 hp-aladdin-01.lab.bos.redhat.com
RHEL 7 x86 64 hp-aladdin-01.lab.bos.redhat.com
Performance was measured on 32 and 64 bits version of RHEL 5 and 6, but not 7 as RHEL 7
has just 64 bits version [11]. To make the figure 6.5 more readable, just RHEL 5 is included
to demonstrate the difference between 32 and 64 bits of the same system. The 32 bits version
is according the expectation from the section 3.3 The RdRand instruction almost exactly half.
During the first stages of development we thought that the multiple variants of the RdRand
instruction (16, 32 and 64-bits) were created primary because of performance, to avoid wasting
of generated bits. But performance testing and later finding of some more documents about
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Intel Secure Key showed that the these variants are there probably just for compatibility with non
64-bit operating systems and for programmer’s comfort. As it is described in the subsection 3.3.3
The RdRand instruction, 64 bits are always pulled out internally.
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Figure 6.5: The differences between 32 and 64-bit of RHEL 5 and RHEL 7 installation.
The differences between 64-bit RHELs are much smaller, yet the RHEL 7 has worse performance
when not on a peak. Furthermore, the peak speed is the same, but is reached with one thread
more, so it seems that on RHEL 7, the system is interrupting the threads more frequently. It can
be also by worse optimization, but this seems to be less probable, because for a single thread,
the speed is the same for all three versions.
Another interesting point is what happens with RHEL 6 after amount of threads reaches the limit
of PUs. At first is still close to other 64 bits systems, but after 10 threads, the performance is
decreasing to almost half of RHEL 5 and 7.
In an effort to find reason of this difference on RHEL, these tests were done (each of them was
independent and not affecting the others):
• Scheduler settings of RHEL6 were changed through sysctl to have the same configura-
tion as on RHEL7.
• Current versions of GCC and OpenMP3 libraries were manually installed.
• The tested application was run also as multiple parallel processes with a single thread,
instead of one process with multiple threads using GNU parallel program.
Scheduler settings and compiler/library versions had just a small effect on the performance drop
on RHEL6. There were just small differences. Running the application as multiple processes
3GCC 4.8.2 with other requested libraries was installed alongside of the distribution’s 4.4.7 into a custom
directory. Makefile was edited respectively.
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with a single thread, on the other side, was completely different and proved even better, than
the results from other systems.
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Figure 6.6: The speed of single thread runs of RdRand test in dependency of amount of parallel
runs. Per-process and total speeds are showed.
Because changing of the GCC and OpenMP library version did not change the behavior, nor
the scheduler options, it seems that the cause is rather in kernel code itself. According of Jiˇr´ı
Hladky´, RHEL 6 has also confirmed similar behavior for other applications that uses more
threads: it seems that the threads are not running concurrently, but sequentially.
This theory was verified by running time measurement, using clock() from time.h. Results for
1–16 threads are in section A.2 Attachments. This test measured time for generating in a single
thread and also total time. This found that up to 8 threads (the breakpoint) is the total time
the same as time of each thread, continually growing. With 9 and more thread, speed of a single
thread fall down to values similar to 4-5 threads, but the total time goes up to multiply times
of any of the thread. Besides, the times of the threads become more fluctuating. This supports
the theory about sequential ordering of threads by kernel, when there are more threads than
processing units.
A possible way how to remove this performance issue, is to use a producent–consument model,
where the generating threads would run independently and fed a buffer as fast as they could
and a single slower thread would not slowdown all application.
6.2.4| Size Dependency
OS Arch. Machine
RHEL 5 x86 64 hp-aladdin-01.lab.bos.redhat.com
In this test, functions rdrand_get_bytes_retry and rdrand_get_uint64_array_retry
were compared in different sizes of the memory area that was filled with random numbers.
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The goal of this test was to find if there is some difference between these two functions; if
the additional logic in the first one has an measurable impact.
Listing 6.10: Test command for chunk size dependency.
./ RdRand -r1 -d5 -m METHOD -c SIZE
For a better visibility, the figure with measured values is split to two parts. The figure 6.7 shows
the difference from 1 to 32 of 64-bit numbers (quadwords) and figure 6.8 shows the rest, from
64 to 8192 generated numbers.
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Figure 6.7: The difference of two functions on different sizes of filled memory area, from 1 to 32
quadwords.
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Figure 6.8: The difference of two functions on different sizes of filled memory area, from 64
to 8192 quadwords.
On these figures it is not much apparent, but in numeric data can be found that there is a very
small difference and the rdrand_get_bytes_retry is about 1 % slower in the figure 6.7. Then
the difference is getting smaller and at the size of 8192 quadwords it is just 0.06 %.
The difference is more apparent on small sizes, but as it is not bigger than the standard deviation,
the rdrand_get_bytes_retry can be safely used in most times.
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6.2.5| Fast and Secure Generating
OS Arch. Machine
RHEL 5 x86 64 hp-aladdin-01.lab.bos.redhat.com
RHEL 5 x86 64 intel-brickland-01.lab.eng.rdu.redhat.com
RHEL 6 x86 64 hp-aladdin-01.lab.bos.redhat.com
RHEL 7 x86 64 hp-aladdin-01.lab.bos.redhat.com
Because the secure methods, described in the section 4.1.2.5 The Library (both functions
rdrand_get_uint64_array_reseed_delay and its skip twin), should not be used in parallel
threads4, only a single thread comparison between them and the rdrand_get_bytes_retry
as a fast method was made. The speed was measured on two different machines with different
type of CPUs (Intel Core i7 and Intel Xeon).
In tables in this section is shown that the delay method is the slowest.The common, fast method
is about one thousand times faster than the skipping method; this is according expectations,
because just one per thousand values is used.
The reason, why on RHEL 5 is the delay method just 0.008 MiB/s, is unknown, but it seems
probable, that it depends on how kernel sleeps and wakes sleeping processes.
hp-aladdin-01 intel-brickland-01
Fast 214.530 MiB/s 73.846 MiB/s
Delay 0.008 MiB/s 0.008 MiB/s
Skip 0.218 MiB/s 0.074 MiB/s
Table 6.5: Comparison of speed of a fast method of generating (rdrand get bytes retry)
and two variants of secure generating on RHEL 5 on two machines.
RHEL 6 RHEL 7
Fast 216.660 MiB/s 218.347 MiB/s
Delay 0.103 MiB/s 0.101 MiB/s
Skip 0.223 MiB/s 0.215 MiB/s
Table 6.6: Comparison of speed of a fast method of generating (rdrand get bytes retry)
and two variants of secure generating on hp-aladdin-01.
The speed of the given by rdrand_get_uint64_array_reseed_skip should be possible to en-
hance by using more threads for the skipping, but implementing of this functionality directly in
the library would add unwanted dependency for OpenMP (it is used in the test and generator
application for multithreading, but library itself can be compiled without it). Because of this, I
decided to do not implement it and just note it here that if someone would need higher speed,
he or she will probably need to implement its own variant of the reseeding function.
Also note, that while the skipping speed on the Brickland machine is about one third of the Al-
addin (see subsection 6.2.6 Testing for more about this difference), the delay is roughly the same.
This is because the skipping method speed depends on speed of RdRand per thread, while
the delay method does not.
4See 4.1.2.5
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6.2.6| Half performance on some machines
All tested machines with an Intel Xeon CPU (the Brickland, for example) had just half perfor-
mance of expected values (and in comparison with desktop/laptop processors).
We passed this to Intel Premier program, yet the only information we received through private
communication were:
The expectation need to be set that RDRAND is slower on IVT-EX because IVT is
missing some optimizations that IVB has and the measurements ran confirm that
after 5 threads, the RdRand throughput maxes out at 375 MiB/s.
And:
This is not a bug in gcc or any other software. It is a deliberate choice by the
CPU designers. Both Ivytown and Haswell have lower RDRAND bandwidth than
Ivybridge. Is there a customer case for having higher RDRAND bandwidth? If so, it
would be good to get that information in front of CPU architects so they can make
the right tradeoffs for future CPUs.
Unfortunately, this is not telling us anything useful and just it raises more questions about
security of this solution, whether the optimizations can affect not just the speed. The only
thing we know for sure is that on newer CPUs the speed is deliberately slower.
6.2.7| Underflow
On dell-pr1700-02.lab.bos.redhat.com, when acquiring values from RdRand in more than four
threads (no matter whether this library was used, or some other program), the RdRand wasn’t
able to meets the requirements and calls of the instructions began to fail. No such another case
was found, so it seems to be just a flaw on the specific silicon. With regards to the fact that
the CPU in this machine is a prototype, this flaw is understandable.
6.3| Specifications of Referenced Machines
Number of cores is sum of all CPUs on each machine.
dell-pr1700-02.lab.bos.redhat.com
CPU: Prototype Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E3-1285 v3 @ 3.60GHz
RAM: 4 GB
Notes: Dell Precision T1700, 4 GB RAM. The internal RNG was not able to handle more than
four parallel threads at November 2013.
hp-aladdin-01.lab.bos.redhat.com
CPU: Intel(R) Core (TM) i7-3920XM CPU @ 2.90GHz (1 NUMA node, 4 cores, HT5)
RAM: 4 GB
Notes: HP elitebook 8770w, used for performance and statistical tests.
intel-brickland-01.lab.eng.rdu.redhat.com
CPU: 4x Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E7-4890 v2 @ 2.80GHz (4 NUMA nodes, 60 cores, HT)
5Hyper-Threading
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RAM: 128 GB
Notes: Used for performance tests.
intel-brickland-02.lab.eng.rdu.redhat.com
CPU: 4x Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E7-4890 v2 @ 2.80GHz (4 NUMA nodes, 60 cores, HT)
RAM: 128 GB
Notes: Used only for statistical tests.
intel-canoepass-01.lab.eng.rdu.redhat.com
CPU: 2x Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2697 v2 @ 2.70GHz (2 NUMA nodes, 24 cores, HT)
RAM: 32 GB
Notes: Used only for statistical tests.
intel-canoepass-02.lab.eng.rdu.redhat.com
CPU: 2x Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2697 v2 @ 2.70GHz (2 NUMA nodes, 24 cores, HT)
RAM: 32 GB
Notes: Used only for statistical tests.
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In this thesis I have described the Intel Secure Key instruction RdRand and the library I made for
its easier usage. Performed tests presented that the real performance is not far from the expected
one and that the produced values have a good statistical properties and can be considered at
least as pseudorandom (section 6.1 Testing).
Performance testing confirmed that the maximum speed of RdRand is close to the presented
value 800 MiB/s, but it also found, that a single thread can never achieve better speed than
800/PUs MiB/s, because the current HW implementation is splitting the maximum perfor-
mance, not the current load. On newer CPUs (Ivy Town, Haswell) the production speed
of RdRand is just 400 MiB/s. Also, the tests uncovered few performance issues on specific
versions of RHEL, namely performance drop on RHEL 6 when there is more reading threads in
one application than PUs (subsection 6.2.3 Testing), and a very slow secure–generating method
on RHEL 5 (subsection 6.2.5 Testing).
The RdRand is a good and fast source of entropy. Unfortunately, revelations about NSA
and other espionage agencies throw a shadow over this technology. One of possible ways
to eliminate a possible compromising is encrypting the generated values by AES in counter
mode. This option is going to be implemented in future versions of the library, which is already
under development.
In current situation, there are some examples of usage, where a potential security risk is not
harmful: The speed allows to use it for erasing hard drives with random values instead of zeroes,
when the erasing is not slowed down by the RNG. Another example is ASLR or similar cases,
when the operating system has just a little entropy collected from other sources soon after
the boot, like Windows 8 currently do [28].
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A| Attachments
A.1| Content of the CD
List of content on the attached CD.
bin - Compiled library and generator (for Fedora 20 x86 64).
data - Full results of tests used for this report.
docs - This report and its source files (LaTeX).
literature - Copy of used literature and webpages, if it is publicly available.
README.txt - Text file containing this same list of content and simple instructions how to
compile the library.
source - Source files of the library, ready for ./configure && make && make install.
A.2| Times of threads on RHEL 6
Result of running time measurement on RHEL 6 on hp-aladdin-01.lab.bos.redhat.com.
cmd : . / RdRand −m r d r a n d g e t b y t e s r e t r y −r1 −t 1
Data w i l l be p r i n t e d to s t d o u t i f −p i s s p e c i f i e d .
t o t a l c l o c k s ( avg ) : 70
t h r e a d 0 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 70
r d r a n d g e t b y t e s r e t r y 215.772 MiB/ s 100 .00 %
cmd : . / RdRand −m r d r a n d g e t b y t e s r e t r y −r1 −t 2
Data w i l l be p r i n t e d to s t d o u t i f −p i s s p e c i f i e d .
t o t a l c l o c k s ( avg ) : 145
t h r e a d 0 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 143
t h r e a d 1 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 144
r d r a n d g e t b y t e s r e t r y 418.631 MiB/ s 100 .00 %
cmd : . / RdRand −m r d r a n d g e t b y t e s r e t r y −r1 −t 3
Data w i l l be p r i n t e d to s t d o u t i f −p i s s p e c i f i e d .
t o t a l c l o c k s ( avg ) : 226
t h r e a d 0 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 224
t h r e a d 1 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 223
t h r e a d 2 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 223
r d r a n d g e t b y t e s r e t r y 600.268 MiB/ s 100 .00 %
cmd : . / RdRand −m r d r a n d g e t b y t e s r e t r y −r1 −t 4
Data w i l l be p r i n t e d to s t d o u t i f −p i s s p e c i f i e d .
t o t a l c l o c k s ( avg ) : 334
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t h r e a d 0 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 330
t h r e a d 1 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 330
t h r e a d 2 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 329
t h r e a d 3 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 329
r d r a n d g e t b y t e s r e t r y 726.714 MiB/ s 100 .00 %
cmd : . / RdRand −m r d r a n d g e t b y t e s r e t r y −r1 −t 5
Data w i l l be p r i n t e d to s t d o u t i f −p i s s p e c i f i e d .
t o t a l c l o c k s ( avg ) : 522
t h r e a d 0 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 515
t h r e a d 1 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 516
t h r e a d 2 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 515
t h r e a d 3 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 516
t h r e a d 4 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 516
r d r a n d g e t b y t e s r e t r y 731.115 MiB/ s 100 .00 %
cmd : . / RdRand −m r d r a n d g e t b y t e s r e t r y −r1 −t 6
Data w i l l be p r i n t e d to s t d o u t i f −p i s s p e c i f i e d .
t o t a l c l o c k s ( avg ) : 753
t h r e a d 0 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 741
t h r e a d 1 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 741
t h r e a d 2 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 738
t h r e a d 3 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 739
t h r e a d 4 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 741
t h r e a d 5 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 742
r d r a n d g e t b y t e s r e t r y 733.988 MiB/ s 100 .00 %
cmd : . / RdRand −m r d r a n d g e t b y t e s r e t r y −r1 −t 7
Data w i l l be p r i n t e d to s t d o u t i f −p i s s p e c i f i e d .
t o t a l c l o c k s ( avg ) : 1022
t h r e a d 0 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 1009
t h r e a d 1 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 1004
t h r e a d 2 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 1003
t h r e a d 3 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 1007
t h r e a d 4 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 1009
t h r e a d 5 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 1006
t h r e a d 6 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 1007
r d r a n d g e t b y t e s r e t r y 733.639 MiB/ s 100 .00 %
cmd : . / RdRand −m r d r a n d g e t b y t e s r e t r y −r1 −t 8
Data w i l l be p r i n t e d to s t d o u t i f −p i s s p e c i f i e d .
t o t a l c l o c k s ( avg ) : 1330
t h r e a d 0 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 1314
t h r e a d 1 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 1312
t h r e a d 2 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 1312
t h r e a d 3 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 1313
t h r e a d 4 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 1312
t h r e a d 5 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 1313
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t h r e a d 6 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 1312
t h r e a d 7 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 1312
r d r a n d g e t b y t e s r e t r y 736.122 MiB/ s 100 .00 %
cmd : . / RdRand −m r d r a n d g e t b y t e s r e t r y −r1 −t 9
Data w i l l be p r i n t e d to s t d o u t i f −p i s s p e c i f i e d .
t o t a l c l o c k s ( avg ) : 1602
t h r e a d 0 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 529
t h r e a d 1 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 508
t h r e a d 2 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 547
t h r e a d 3 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 413
t h r e a d 4 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 501
t h r e a d 5 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 547
t h r e a d 6 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 520
t h r e a d 7 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 568
t h r e a d 8 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 471
r d r a n d g e t b y t e s r e t r y 421.251 MiB/ s 100 .00 %
cmd : . / RdRand −m r d r a n d g e t b y t e s r e t r y −r1 −t 10
Data w i l l be p r i n t e d to s t d o u t i f −p i s s p e c i f i e d .
t o t a l c l o c k s ( avg ) : 1488
t h r e a d 0 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 480
t h r e a d 1 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 463
t h r e a d 2 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 501
t h r e a d 3 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 499
t h r e a d 4 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 476
t h r e a d 5 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 458
t h r e a d 6 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 418
t h r e a d 7 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 431
t h r e a d 8 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 508
t h r e a d 9 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 588
r d r a n d g e t b y t e s r e t r y 603.341 MiB/ s 100 .00 %
cmd : . / RdRand −m r d r a n d g e t b y t e s r e t r y −r1 −t 11
Data w i l l be p r i n t e d to s t d o u t i f −p i s s p e c i f i e d .
t o t a l c l o c k s ( avg ) : 1611
t h r e a d 0 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 237
t h r e a d 1 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 376
t h r e a d 2 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 460
t h r e a d 3 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 493
t h r e a d 4 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 380
t h r e a d 5 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 390
t h r e a d 6 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 396
t h r e a d 7 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 365
t h r e a d 8 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 446
t h r e a d 9 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 390
t h r e a d 10 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 353
r d r a n d g e t b y t e s r e t r y 487.343 MiB/ s 100 .00 %
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cmd : . / RdRand −m r d r a n d g e t b y t e s r e t r y −r1 −t 12
Data w i l l be p r i n t e d to s t d o u t i f −p i s s p e c i f i e d .
t o t a l c l o c k s ( avg ) : 1660
t h r e a d 0 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 435
t h r e a d 1 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 296
t h r e a d 2 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 389
t h r e a d 3 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 474
t h r e a d 4 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 470
t h r e a d 5 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 419
t h r e a d 6 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 442
t h r e a d 7 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 284
t h r e a d 8 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 354
t h r e a d 9 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 440
t h r e a d 10 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 376
t h r e a d 11 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 443
r d r a n d g e t b y t e s r e t r y 516.715 MiB/ s 100 .00 %
cmd : . / RdRand −m r d r a n d g e t b y t e s r e t r y −r1 −t 13
Data w i l l be p r i n t e d to s t d o u t i f −p i s s p e c i f i e d .
t o t a l c l o c k s ( avg ) : 1760
t h r e a d 0 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 272
t h r e a d 1 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 379
t h r e a d 2 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 355
t h r e a d 3 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 447
t h r e a d 4 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 331
t h r e a d 5 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 398
t h r e a d 6 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 401
t h r e a d 7 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 412
t h r e a d 8 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 397
t h r e a d 9 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 331
t h r e a d 10 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 334
t h r e a d 11 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 363
t h r e a d 12 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 353
r d r a n d g e t b y t e s r e t r y 482.253 MiB/ s 100 .00 %
cmd : . / RdRand −m r d r a n d g e t b y t e s r e t r y −r1 −t 14
Data w i l l be p r i n t e d to s t d o u t i f −p i s s p e c i f i e d .
t o t a l c l o c k s ( avg ) : 1834
t h r e a d 0 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 152
t h r e a d 1 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 365
t h r e a d 2 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 339
t h r e a d 3 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 439
t h r e a d 4 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 370
t h r e a d 5 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 441
t h r e a d 6 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 279
t h r e a d 7 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 395
t h r e a d 8 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 308
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t h r e a d 9 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 455
t h r e a d 10 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 354
t h r e a d 11 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 368
t h r e a d 12 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 276
t h r e a d 13 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 377
r d r a n d g e t b y t e s r e t r y 459.098 MiB/ s 100 .00 %
cmd : . / RdRand −m r d r a n d g e t b y t e s r e t r y −r1 −t 15
Data w i l l be p r i n t e d to s t d o u t i f −p i s s p e c i f i e d .
t o t a l c l o c k s ( avg ) : 1940
t h r e a d 0 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 385
t h r e a d 1 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 279
t h r e a d 2 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 407
t h r e a d 3 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 284
t h r e a d 4 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 290
t h r e a d 5 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 357
t h r e a d 6 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 253
t h r e a d 7 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 286
t h r e a d 8 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 248
t h r e a d 9 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 237
t h r e a d 10 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 436
t h r e a d 11 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 261
t h r e a d 12 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 292
t h r e a d 13 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 396
t h r e a d 14 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 286
r d r a n d g e t b y t e s r e t r y 427.849 MiB/ s 100 .00 %
cmd : . / RdRand −m r d r a n d g e t b y t e s r e t r y −r1 −t 16
Data w i l l be p r i n t e d to s t d o u t i f −p i s s p e c i f i e d .
t o t a l c l o c k s ( avg ) : 2046
t h r e a d 0 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 188
t h r e a d 1 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 327
t h r e a d 2 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 315
t h r e a d 3 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 271
t h r e a d 4 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 382
t h r e a d 5 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 329
t h r e a d 6 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 329
t h r e a d 7 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 350
t h r e a d 8 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 364
t h r e a d 9 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 299
t h r e a d 10 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 323
t h r e a d 11 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 392
t h r e a d 12 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 362
t h r e a d 13 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 396
t h r e a d 14 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 295
t h r e a d 15 c l o c k s ( avg ) : 323
r d r a n d g e t b y t e s r e t r y 411.730 MiB/ s 100 .00 %
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B| Glossary
ASLR – Address Space Layout Randomization. Security mechanism involving randomisation
of memory addresses of various system data structures to make it harder to change them
in an attack.
RNG – Random number generator.
PRNG – Pseudorandom number generator.
CSPRNG – Cryptographicaly secure PRNG.
TRNG – True random number generator.
LCRNG – Linear congruential random number generator – a basic PRNG, probably most widely
used [31, p. 151].
LRNG – Linux Random Number Generator – a RNG used in Linux Kernel.
Entropy – Measure of disorder and uncertainty of a system. In this report the term entropy
can also refer to a random value itself from an information source. See chapter 2 Random
Numbers and Deterministic Machines.
PU – Processing Unit. A CPU with 2 cores and Hyper–Threading has 4 PUs.
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